Introduction and summary
Europe has been an object of constant scrutiny and criticism since the beginning of the economic crisis of 2008, and more so with the explosion of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Recurrent news media expressions such as 'euro-crisis' have popularised the idea that there is something irremediably wrong in the project of the European Union, which threatens its very existence as a political entity. The economic crisis -turned by austerity policies into a long and deep depression of Europe's periphery -has shown the rising power and increasing lack of legitimacy of the current technocratic institutions of the European Union, including the European Council, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission. Yet, the protest movements which have developed in the old continent in response to the crisis, and in particular the 'subterranean politics' of the indignados and Occupy groups, have shown little interest in a transformation of European governance structures and policies. Anti-austerity protests have largely developed at a national level with limited transnational coordination and vision. While rightly criticising neoliberal policies pursued at the European level, protests have mostly ended up seeing Europe only as the culprit and not also as the space where a political alternative to neoliberalism could be developed.
In this chapter we analyse anti-austerity protests in Europe, exploring their nature of 'subterranean politics' and the way they relate to the European political space. We argue that anti-austerity movements, as well as more institutional forces like European trade unions, have fallen short from making European institutions and policies the main target of their campaigns, despite the fact that they had a pivotal role in dictating austerity policies on the continent. Most campaigning efforts have focused on the implementation of policies at the national level, instead of challenging decision power at the European level.
We begin by surveying protest events, inquiring as to their national or transnational character. The great majority of anti-austerity mobilisations have developed within a national context, associated with struggles of resistance against plant closures, unemployment, cuts in public services, or to youth protests in schools and universities. In comparison truly panEuropean anti-austerity events have had a more limited reach and impact. The lack of interest for Europe as a political space is visible in the different political visions emerging from anti-austerity movements, where scepticism towards the possibility of turning the European project towards progressive and equitable ends dominates. Different visions of Europe have developed within anti-austerity mobilisations, in experts' networks and in major campaigns, driving actions and policy initiatives. First, short term proposals for change emphasised the need for a European adjustment, with reforms of the Monetary Union and financial markets that included the introduction of the Financial Transaction Tax, the creation of Eurobonds, an extended role of the ECB and a less restrictive view of fiscal integration within Europe. A second perspective pointed to the reversal of European integration, reviving national political processes, responding to the financial crisis with some debt repudiation, considering a break up of the euro and the return to domestic currencies. Third, a longer term view of a Europe beyond neoliberalism argued that greater European integration should not be based on the dominance of the single market and currency, but on a vision of greater democracy, sustainable and more equal growth, with the drastic reduction of the power of finance, the elimination of tax havens, reduction of the burden of debt, protection of welfare and labour rights, and the introduction of coordinated fiscal policies capable of avoiding a new great depression.
On the limited occasions when social mobilisations have directly and explicitly addressed European issues, a variety of positions have emerged, ranging from trade unions arguing for a European adjustment to indignados and radical grassroot groups demanding a reversal of European integration, while the question of a post-neoliberal Europe has influenced public opinion and activists but has not yet been associated with large scale mobilisations.
This lack of a shared European vision in anti-austerity mobilisations reflects the absence of a pan-European democratic space and of a clear set of European political institutions social movements can confront in pursuing their goals. Without a legitimate and visible 'site' of democratic politics in Europe, mobilisations against neoliberal policies may increasingly retreat to the context of national politics, with dangerous consequences both for the individual countries and for Europe as a whole.
Subterranean Politics and the European Space
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 new actors have appeared on the European scene as part of a common anti-austerity 'protest wave' (Tarrow, 1994: 153) . Besides activism from established organisations, including trade unions, this protest wave has been marked by the appearance of the 'subterranean politics' of the indignados and Occupy groups, which have been particularly active in Spain, Greece, Portugal, and the UK, where a number of occupations of public spaces and protest encampments have taken place since 2011.
The activism associated with 'subterranean politics' -examined in detail in other chapters of this book -has had many similarities with the anti-globalisation movement, including the emphasis on consensus-based decision-making and direct action. Yet, there have also been significant differences: as seen in the adoption of the square occupation tactic, and in the attempt to defuse antagonism so as to appeal to large sectors of the population. Indignados and Occupy groups have configured subterranean politics as fundamentally a 'civic politics', a politics of citizens who do not feel represented by existing political institutions, including parties and trade unions, as expressed by recurrent slogans like 'no me representan' (they don't represent me) (see Gerbaudo 2012) .
The extent to which these forms of subterranean politics can constitute a means for a democratic renewal in Europe, capable to address the current crisis of legitimacy of democratic institutions, remains to be established, and it lies beyond the scope of our discussion. In this chapter we focus instead on the extent to which this type of activism -alongside other, more traditional, anti-austerity protests -has engaged with Europe as a political space. Is Europe seen as an enemy only, or does it possibly represent a way towards an alternative politics? And how did the European space of protest sit alongside national spaces in their mobilisations? Are these movements a symptom of a 'return of the national', as some have suggested (see for example Gerbaudo, 2012: 10) , or do they articulate a coherent transnational vision?
The activism wave of the anti-globalisation movement demonstrated the increasingly transnational character of social mobilisations in a globally interconnected world. In mobilising against global institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisations (WTO), or the G7/G8, activists built complex transnational alliances, acted across borders, and aimed to construct a new democratic space at the global level (Della Porta, 2007, Pianta and Marchetti, 2007) . In this context of transnational protests, Europe acquired importance as an intermediate space between the national and the global, where common mobilisations could emerge. Europe became a crucial terrain for many activists intending to escape the narrow confines of a nation state increasingly weakened by global markets. This effort to construct a radical European space is shown by the experiences of the European Social Forum, and by the 'Europeanization of public discourses and mobilization ' (Della Porta, Caiani, 2007) .
The anti-globalisation movement perceived Europe as a new centre of power to be targeted, but also as a new political space in which to construct new forms of democracy and collective action. But is this still the case for contemporary anti-austerity protests, and in particular for the subterranean politics of indignados and Occupy groups? We answer to these questions through an analysis of various movement documents, including manifestoes, assembly resolutions, position papers, and publications, as well as a mapping of relevant anti-austerity protest events in Europe.
What emerges from the trajectory of mobilisation and from the agenda of contemporary anti-austerity movements is that Europe as a political space has, by and large, lost the relevance it had during the time of the anti-globalisation movement. In spite of a common understanding of the nature of the crisis and of neoliberal policies, European mobilisations up to 2013 have mostly framed their campaigns within national political contexts, leaving little room for the development of a truly continental mobilisation. Moreover, markedly different positions have emerged on how to address the crisis, leaving no room for the building of a clear alternative to the European status quo.
Trajectories of mobilisation
Anti-austerity mobilisations in Europe from 2009 to 2013 have been characterised by a nationalrather than transnational -character. While the recession and austerity measures have been common to most EU countries, protests and activism have developed along autonomous lines in different European countries, with limited cross-border coordination. Anti-austerity mobilisations have tended to reflect the rhythm of national politics. Calls to protest have been made in response to national government measures, such as the announcement of budget cuts, as well as in reaction to major effects of the crisis at the national level, such as high unemployment, job losses, youth and student dissatisfaction. Since 2012, protests have also addressed the heavy police repression used by governments in Southern European countries 1 .
1. The other chapters in this book provide extensive evidence on the national specificities that have shaped the framing of contention, the mobilisation of particular actors, the forms of action that have been adopted, leading to widely different patterns of activism.
In order to analyse the trajectory of Europe-wide anti-austerity mobilisations since the start of the crisis in 2008, in this chapter we adopt the methodology and definitions used in the analysis of parallel summits and global civil society events (Pianta, 2001; Gerbaudo and Pianta, 2012) . We identify only a limited number of events with clear cross-border co-ordination and European ambition, amongst which a handful of events stem from experiences of subterranean politics. Table 1 reports the main European protest events from 2008 to June 2013. Few protests have been recorded, although with increasingly frequentcy since 2012; their trajectory is discontinuous, with no persistence of particular mobilisations -with the exception of trade union actions. The range of actors involved is rather limited; the European content of mobilisations is uncertain.
The scarcity of pan-European protests is made particularly baffling by the fact that there was no shortage of events that could have constituted a target for protest. Many important decisions which have influenced the way in which the crisis has been managed have been taken at high profile EU meetings, including European Council meetings, EU finance ministers meetings, and EU summits like the one in March 2012, where the 'Fiscal Compact' was decided; or at meetings between heads of state, such as the frequent ones held between the French president Nicolas Sarkozy and the German chancellor Angela Merkel. Each of these events offered a clear ''political opportunity'' (Tarrow, 1994: 15) for protest activity. Yet only sporadically did people mobilise in protest against them and the policies put forward. And on no occasion did we witness anything comparable to the counter-summit protests of the anti-globalisation movement, such as those in Prague in 2000 or Genoa in 2001. While European élites carried out neoliberal policies that contributed to worsening the crisis, European social movements appeared unable to build a continent-wide opposition.
In analysing the trajectory of anti-austerity mobilisations, we look separately at the two main actors that have been involved in anti-austerity protests in Europe: the subterranean politics of the 'indignados' and Occupy groups, and the more institutionalised politics of European trade unions and the ETUC.
The former represent the main novelty of the anti-austerity protest cycle. Using the format of the protest encampment, like those established in Puerta del Sol in Madrid and in Syntagma Square in Athens, these movements have found powerful ways to give voice to the widespread popular opposition to austerity policies (Gerbaudo, 2012) . They have created new spaces of democratic decision-making and grassroots participation. However, these movements have not managed to scale-up anti-austerity protest to the European level. The indignados movement, as it has developed in Spain and Greece, has mainly focused on rejecting the politics of austerity at the national level, opposing the implementation of deep cuts to public spending and protesting its dramatic consequences on employment and public services. It is true that some sections of these movements, especially the more politicised groups stemming from the anti-globalisation protest cycle, harboured the hope that the movement would transcend national boundaries and would blossom into an European Spring. However, such transnationalisation attempts have had limited success.
The indignados movement emerged in Spain in 2009 -see the chapter on Spain in this book for a detailed account -and had a limited diffusion in other countries. Only in Greece, did a local indignados movement established in late May 2011 and called, in Greek, Αγανακτισμένοι (to be translitterated as 'aganaktismenoi'), -come to be recognised in the spring and summer of 2011 as a powerful social actor. Despite several attempts and efforts, other countries, like France and Italy, have not proven fertile ground for the indignados (see the Italian chapter, pp XX), reflecting the strong specificity of this movement. The primary occurence of transnational coordination of protest events was in October 2011, when the movement launched a coordinated day of protest; under the slogan ''United for Global Change'', demonstrations took place in dozens of European cities on October 15, 2011, with the biggest ones in Madrid and Rome. In Rome the demonstration ended in violent clashes with the police -and with deep divisions within social movements. The demonstration in Brussels, originally planned to be the major event of the day with a march of Spanish protestors arriving in the European capital, ended up attracting only few thousand participants. While all in all turnout to the protest across Europe was big, totalling around one million people, the event did not seem to produce any lasting results in terms of organisational capacity and political influence.
A second attempt to turn the wave of anti-austerity protests from a series of disconnected national efforts into a coordinated pan-European campaign were the ''Blockupy Frankfurt''days of action, in which local autonomous groups and Attac Germany played a significant role. The protests took place between the 16th and the 19th of May 2012 in the German city, and targeted the European Central Bank (ECB), considered the decisive institution responsible for directing austerity policies at the European level. Tens of thousands of activists, mostly Germans with some Italians and few French, converged in Frankfurt. Nevertheless, the protest did not spark broader pan-European actions. Harsh repression by the German police, with authorities imposing a strict protest ban, contributed to its relative failure. However, its limited degree of success was also down to the difficulty of creating a sense of common purpose among different sections of the European anti-austerity movement, as seen in the difficulty of mobilising participants from outside -in particular from Spain and Greece -and the perception that the event was managed by German activists alone. A second 'Blockupy Frankfurt' took place in May 2013 with similar outcomes (see Box 1).
Other attempts to build Europe-wide mobilisations against austerity rooted in the experiences of the indignados have also had limited success. The Spring Days of Action against austerity, and in particular the March 14, 2013 protests against the Spring meeting of the European Council, were attended by few thousands people and had little resonance in the press, particularly when compared to national events like the protests against the crisis in Cyprus around the same period. All in all, the subterranean politics of the indignados has proven very difficult to scale up to the European level.
Similar problems in developing Europe-wide mobilisations can be seen in trade union activity. The main actor here is the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), established in 1973, which represents 60 million workers all over Europe and is an obvious candidate to lead a pan-European campaign against austerity. However, the divisions among members of ETUCwhich includes both more militant and more moderate unions, and unions from both 'centre' and 'periphery' countries of Europe, with starkly different economic and social conditions -have made it difficult for the organisation to develop a major wave of cross-border activism and to commit significant resources to Europe-wide mobilisations. Overly focused on the national level, trade unions have had only a small impact on the policy agenda at the continental level.
The most prominent anti-austerity protest organised by the ETUC thus far has been the European strike/day of action called for November 14, 2012, which saw general strikes in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, and national demonstrations across the rest of the EU. The event was historically important as the first true attempt at a general strike in Europe, and included a strong participation of ''indignados'' and similar groups in several countries. Its outcomes, however, were highly uneven: in Spain there was a very large participation with mass demonstrations; 80 local demonstrations were held in Italy, where also students took to the streets; in Greece the protest ended with clashes in Athens' streets; a more limited outcome emerged in Portugal; and in the rest of the EU trade union demonstrations were organised, but with no strike action (see Box 2). This day of action built upon a number of prior protests organised by the ETUC in Brussels and in other European cities. The most notable example of these events was the ETUC march organised on September 29, 2010, when about 100,000 people, representing all the countries of the European Union, marched in Brussels. Other noteworthy events included the 'Eurodemonstration' in Wroclaw on 17 September 2011, the 'No to Austerity' demonstration in Budapest on April 9, 2011 and the European Day of Action on March 24, 2011, which featured a number of small protests around Europe.
The limited impact of these protests reflects the reduced power of organised labour and the lack of a common strategy for responding to the crisis, as well as the weakness of the ETUC compared to the ability of business groups and lobbies to influence European policies (Hyman, 2005) . Trade unions have responded to national governments' austerity plans mainly through industry-specific and general strikes at the country level. Plant closures, job losses, the precarisation of work and record youth unemployment have deeply divided the unions' base, making the construction of effective social alliances more difficult. The challenge to extend such alliances across countries with very different conditions -from crisis-ravaged European 'periphery' to those countries of the 'centre' largely shielded from economic problems -has proved to be out of reach for Europe's trade unions, as well as for labour-based political strategies.
Anti-austerity protests, both those taking the form of the subterranean politics of indignados groups, and at the more institutional level of trade unions, have thus been characterised by a high national fragmentation and by an incapacity to construct a coordinated campaign at the continental level, commensurate to the governance structures directing austerity policies. This failure comes just few years after a strong wave of anti-globalisation protest agitated Europe (Pianta and Marchetti, 2007) , leading to a significant impact on the political process in major European countries and to some changes in national policies, such as debt cancellation for developing countries, trade liberalisation and the introduction of the financial transaction tax (Utting et al., 2012) . For several years the European Social Forum, launched in Florence in 2002, was a gathering point for all those opposed to neoliberalism and served as a platform for coordinating continental campaigns. However, its structure relied on inter-organisational relationships that led to a progressive loss of relevance and participation, ending with the 2010 European Social Forum in Istanbul.
An effort to 're-create' this space of grassroots dialogue among activists was made with the Florence 10+10 November 2012 meeting 'Uniting forces for another Europe'. It was organised ten years after the first European Social Forum, with the goal of looking ten years into the Europe's future.. Four thousand activists from 300 networks, and organisations from 28 countries of Europe participated in the event, including representatives from well-established EU civil society networks, trade unionists, grassroots militants, 'older' anti-globalisation veterans and 'younger' activists from the indignados and Occupy experiences. The gathering of such a wide range of forces was a significant success and led to the organisation of protests on March 14 th 2013.. However ,the debates on the way out of Europe's crisis remained rather fragmented, failing to lead to a shared framing of European mobilisations that could lead to widespread coordinated actions. Ultimately, Florence 10+10 was unable to overcome the difficulty in articulating a coherent vision for an alternative, post-liberal Europe. The same weakness emerged in June 2013 at the AlterSummit organised in Athens by a similar range of forces; participation, the involvement of Greek movements, and the overall impact were limited, despite the overt intentions of the organisers to create a pan-European movement. 
Visions and alternatives
Besides the lack of international coordination of anti-austerity protests, the incapacity of movements to articulate a clear Europe-wide strategy is rooted in the different visions of Europe that have emerged and in widespread euro-scepticism. Anti-austerity mobilisations have by and large failed in converging on one common vision that might constitute the vehicle for developing a credible alternative to the European 'status quo'.
Three different visions of Europe have emerged as major frames of anti-austerity protests.A first perspective, focusing on short term changes needed to respond to Europe's crisis, is that of a European adjustment, which envisages limited reforms of the Monetary Union and financial markets -including the introduction of the Financial Transaction Tax, the creation of Eurobonds, an extended role of the ECB and a less restrictive view of fiscal integration within Europe -without altering the existing framework of European integration. Second is the frame of a reversal of European integration, which sees the revival of national political processes, a response to the financial crisis with some debt repudiation, consideration of the break-up of the euro and a return to domestic currencies, a reversion to less open and less integrated economies, and the recovery of some degree of national policy sovereignty. Third is the frame of a Europe beyond neoliberalism, which argues that greater European integration should not be based on the dominance of the single market and currency but on a vision of a democratic Europe with sustainable and more equal growth: a vision that includes a drastic reduction in the power of finance, the elimination of tax havens, a reduction of the burden of debt, the protection of welfare and labour rights, and the introduction of coordinated fiscal policies capable of avoiding a new great depression.
These three frames are less mutually incompatible than might be thought, and the importance attached to them also depends on the gravity of the crisis in different countries. The proposals for reform of the Monetary Union and the ECB, the 'easiest' to implement, are widely shared and, if enacted earlier, would have very likely been successful in preventing the vicious circle of austerity and crisis in the South of Europe. Now that the depression in the 'periphery' is more dramatic, more drastic measures to curb the freedom of action of finance are necessaryCyprus' banking crisis in 2013 has been addressed by introducing controls on capital movements. The proposals for a different model of European integration, reversing austerity, with less power for the markets and an enhanced role for democracy, are much harder to put in the EU policy agenda, but become more urgent as the recession worsens. If the crisis gets out of hand, in a perilous scenario of disintegration of the euro and of Europe, this could necessitate a return -amidst great difficulties -to national economies with their own currencies and lower external openness.
Adjusting Europe?
A clear statement of the need for adjusting European institutions and policies has come from the European Trade Union Confederation. At its May 2011 congress in Athens, ETUC denounced the deepening spiral of debt, austerity and unemployment. Its emergency resolution read: 'To get out of the crisis, Europe must help countries in crisis such as Greece with an ambitious investment and development programme to generate growth and employment and with that income and tax revenue. However, anybody sticking to the one-sided austerity plan, accepts the collapse of the Eurozone. ' The need for addressing the debt crisis through European solidarity and for reversing austerity policies are at the centre of the work of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), which has produced two volumes on policy alternatives: After the Crisis (Watt and Botsch, 2010) and Exiting from the Crisis (Coats, 2012, with a preface by Joseph Stiglitz). They include contributions from dozens of American and European economists and trade unionists on themes ranging from the tax on financial transactions to policies to stimulate demand, from controls on capital movements to protection of labour rights and wages.
These proposals were discussed -among several trade union initiatives -at the conference 'Beyond the Crisis: Developing Sustainable Alternatives', organized at the European Parliament by the Socialist, Democratic and Green MEPs (9 February 2012). The discussion was an encounter between economists, unions and politicians of various extractions on how to deal with the crisis, reduce inequality, change the growth model and develop the green economy. A common critique emerged on the rules of European economic governance and on the 'Fiscal Compact' later adopted by the euro-area, two issues on which the euro-parliamentary groups of Socialists & Democrats, Greens, and European Left (GUE-NGL) were united in opposing the decisions of the Council and Commission.
The criticism on the effects of the European policy of austerity -budget balance written into constitutions, repayment of a portion of the public debt -has been further developed in a volume by Hoang Ngoc (2011), a French Socialist MEP and an economics professor at the Sorbonne. The proposals include a different role for the ECB, Eurobonds, a public investment programme, the tax on financial transactions, and European harmonization of corporate taxes.
These criticisms have widely informed the positions of social-democratic parties in Europe, but they have failed to build a common front for change and could not prevent the European Council launching the Fiscal Compact in the spring of 2012. Even the election victory of the socialist François Hollande in May 2012 did not reverse this course of European policy, in spite of his efforts to emphasise the need for growth as well as austerity.
Yet despite this, even within the establishment, an understanding of the need for adjusting European policies has become evident. 'Founding fathers' of the European Union like Romano Prodi, former President of the Commission, and Giuliano Amato, former Vice-President of the European Convention responsible for preparing the draft Constitution, have advocated a federal model for a 'United States of Europe' with fiscal and political integration; they want Europe to impose the Tobin tax on financial transactions, contend that the 60 per cent ceiling on the debt/GDP ratio be guaranteed collectively by the Monetary Union as a whole, and call for the issue of Eurobonds (EU securities to fund development projects) and a larger EU budget no longer dependent strictly on member state transfers. They also propose a constitutional convention for the revision of the European treaties, granting observer status to representatives of employer and labour organizations, civil society and local and regional governments.
However, the decisions of the European Council in 2012 and 2013 have not changed the trajectory of policy for addressing the crisis; the only novelties have come from the new leadership of Mario Draghi at the ECB, who has clearly stated that he will protect the euro 'by whatever means necessary' and has managed to introduce new policy tools that have limited -to some extent -financial speculation on the public debt of countries of Europe's periphery.
In spite of an increasing understanding of the need for a new course for Europe, official policy has not changed. The battle over the prospects for 'adjusting Europe' seems to be mainly played within the ranks of Europe's élite, with little opening to the demands of civil society, the trade unions and or to progressive political forces such as social-democratic and green parties.
Reversing European integration?
As documented in the country chapters of this book, most mobilisations of 'subterranean politics' paid little attention to Europe and gave priority to a return to national political processes. Some grassroot protests and more radical groups have reacted to the crisis with a fundamental critique of European integration and the power of finance. Such euro-sceptical position appeared to be dominant within the indignados movement, with Europe primarily seen as a problem to dispose with, rather than as a means towards the solution of the economic crisis.
Both in Spain and in Greece, some actors part of the indignados movement, including constituent groups and local assemblies, have taken positions that come close to the idea of a reversal of European integration. In May 2011, for example, the group Democracia Real Ya (DRY), one of the key organisations of the Spanish indignados, included among its proposals for political and economic renewal 'compulsory referenda on laws imposed by the European Union'2. In 2012 one of the factions that emerged from the internal fighting within DRY, which took the name Asociacion Dry, explicitly discussed the possibility of an abandonment of the euro and a return to the peseta, and argued for forms of national protectionism3.
The attitude of the Greek indignados has been similar. Since the birth of the movement in late May 2011, Europe has been often seen as just an enemy to be kept at bay. This perception is well captured by the presence of a flag of Europe in which the stars had been replaced by swastikas, as one of the authors of this chapter witnessed during his research visit in Athens. In the first declaration of the assembly of Syntagma Square, protestors were casting European institutions as invaders that had to be sent back home: 'we will not leave the squares until those who compelled us to come here leave the country: the governments, the Troika (EU, ECB, and IMF), the IMF Memoranda and everyone who exploit us'. Many indignados activists, as well as some trade unions, have asked for a return to the drachma. Conversely, the rising Greek Party of the Left, Syriza -which under the leadership of Alexis Tsipras received 26 per cent of the votes in the 2012 second general elections in June4 -has adopted a more favourable position towards Europe and the common currency, stating its intention to remain in the euro as long as it was possible and feasible.
Euro-scepticism has also been present in the anti-austerity protests in other countries. In Italy, a distancing from Europe and the euro has been advocated by small groups of activists and an anti-European stance has been typical of the populist 'Five Star Movement' of the former comedian Beppe Grillo, which obtained 25 per cent of the votes in the general election of February 2013 5 . In the French debate, voices critical of European integration have often emerged from radical grassroot and Left groups, questioning the euro and advocating protectionist policies. In 2013 arguments for reducing European integration and a break-up of the eurozone have come in France from Bernard Cassen, long involved in the World Social Forums, and in Germany by Oskar Lafontaine, former leader of the Left party Die Linke. Such views, however, remain far from dominant in the broad anti-austerity movements of these countries.
A post-liberal Europe?
The combination of demands for a radical departure from current policies and a view of Europe as a key arena for political action has been slow to emerge in the mobilisations we have examined. Only since 2012 have these elements started to characterise major initiatives, such as the launch of the AlterSummit -a network of trade unions and civil society groups -the protest of 'Blockupy Frankfurt', European strikes such as the one on Novemeber 14 th 2012 and a range of national initiatives, some of them involving parts of the indignados and Occupy movement.
The large participation of activists' networks -including all the above groups -in the Florence 10+10 meeting, 'Uniting Forces for Another Europe', held in November 2012, was a significant development in activists' ability to address the European question. In spite of the fragmentation of perspectives and initiatives, recognition of the need for a 'post-liberal Europe' has started to emerge, but has not yet resulted in wide-ranging coordinated protests at the European level.
Yet while these efforts have fallen short of a shared framing for contestation, and different views on Europe are present in mobilisations, a growing number of initiatives by experts' networks, civil society groups and social movements in several EU countries have put on the agenda a radical critique of European policies and proposals for an alternative Europe.
Much effort has focused on the need for alternatives to Europe's economic policies. The 2013 edition of the annual Euromemorandum (2012), backed by 350 European economists, called for limiting the freedom of action of the financial sector, enhancing the role of the European Central Bank as lender of last resort, replacing austerity with policies of increasing public demand, wage support, full employment and shorter working hours. In France, the Manifeste des economistes atterrés (Economistes atterrés, 2011) became a hugely popular denounciation of financial excesses -and a surprise bestseller. The manifesto dismantles the 'false certainties' of the virtuous functioning of markets and proposes severe restrictions on those financial activities that brought speculation and crisis. In a second book, the same group denounced the Fiscal Compact (the latest European Treaty, introduced in Spring 2012). With its requirements for balanced budgets and the reimbursement of the public debt in excess of 60 per cent of GDP, the French economists argue that the Fiscal Compact is contributing to the depression of Europe's economy (Economistes atterrés, 2012). A new book by Michel Aglietta (2012) suggests that only a federal Europe can make the euro a sovereign currency and end the crisis. He calls for making the ECB a lender of last resort, integrating fiscal policy at European level, issuing Eurobonds, and narrowing the gap between the production capacity of the European 'centre' and the 'periphery'. Detailed analysis and proposals on the public debt problem are brought together in the volume produced by the Attac campaign (2011).
In Germany, a thorough analysis of the mechanisms of the crisis and the missteps of European policy was set out by a hundred academic advisors to Attac Germany, the German affiliate of the international network that for years now has been urging the taxation of the financial industry and the abandonment of free-market policies. They denounced the spread of the crisis from private banks to sovereign debt, pointed to the risk of a crisis of hegemony that could bring new conflicts, and called for an end to the logic of growth, for managed default to reduce the debt, and for the taxation of capital assets and finance.
In Italy, Europe's crisis has been at the centre of a debate on 'Europe's course', started by the civil society campaign Sbilanciamoci! (Rossanda and Pianta, 2012) in Europe the debate was hosted by openDemocracy (www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it) and other European groups. A Forum on 'The Way Out' of Europe's crisis was attended by 800 people in Florence on 9 December 2011, at which the idea of a European appeal was first discussed. The Appeal 'Another Road for Europe' was then launched in May 2012 by a large number of European intellectuals and activists (including one of the authors, see Box 3). The Appeal called for a debate on these issues at the European Parliament, which was subsequently held on June 28, 2012, at the same time as the European Council meeting. The Forum 'Another Road for Europe' saw many of the signatories discuss the alternatives to Europe's crisis with civil society networks, trade unions, and MEP from the Socialist and Democrats, Green and United Left groups in the European Parliament, as well as with national politicians. The demands that emerged there were common to a number of other policy documents produced by civil society and political initiatives. A new development in the European links among groups active on economic alternatives has been the creation at the Florence 10+10 meeting of the European Progressive Economists Network (Euro-pen) that has launched there a 'Common Call for Another Economic Policy for Europe' (see Box 4). Novel initiatives at the European level are planned in the run up to the European elections of May 2014.
Conclusion: in search of European politics
The mobilisations against austerity in Europe highlight a paradox. While European institutions -the European Council, the European Commission and the European Central Bankare responsible for the responses to the financial crisis and the austerity policies imposed on Europe, social movements have rarely challenged these institutions directly. Truly continental campaigns have been slow to emerge and have yet to develop a shared alternative to current policies.
This paradox is the result of two major factors. First, what we are witnessing looks like a European contention in search of framing, with mobilisations absorbed by the immediate challenge of resisting at the national level the economic and political effects of the European crisis. This is the level where the political process is most structured and visible, where the political system and civil society are ready to frame social responses to the crisis in well tested forms -trade unions protests and negotiations about layoffs and unemployment protection; political protests by opposition parties; anti-government protests by radical groups. What these responses are missing is the European nature of the crisis and of the political process leading to austerity policies; no common frame is yet available for defining this as an issue of Europeanwide contention, where mobilisation can develop and have an impact on policies.
The second factor is the lack of a European political space with 'visible' power structures and an 'understandable' institutional setting that can provide the context for European mobilisations. The lack of a European public space as an arena for common discussion and deliberation on shared problems is a well-known weakness of the European construction, and this has certainly influenced the inability of mobilisations to develop a common framing. But what may be more important today is the lack of a democratic politics at the European level that could provide an 'entry point' for contestation; European contention appears to be in search of the very 'site' of politics where contestation can take place. The 'dispersed' nature of European authority is a clear factor, with power distributed between the European Council, the Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), with a marginal role played by the European Parliament. The emphasis on inter-governmental decision making during the crisis has put national governments (apparently) at the centre of the European stage, where they have found themselves heavily constrained by supranational European authority -such as the 'independent' ECB -, by the rise of German influence on EU policies and asymmetries in intergovernmental processes, and by the unchallenged power of finance in key areas.
With no 'site' of European contention, Europe-wide mobilisation has been limited. Social movements share a common "diagnostic" (Snow and Benford, 2000) analysis of the causes of the crisis: the power of finance and in the neoliberal policies which for the last two decades have dominated Europe's economic governance. But the different groups that have been at the forefront of campaigns at the European level -from the trade unions to the new subterranean politics of the indignados -do not share a common alternative vision, nor do they agree on possible solutions.
In this chapter, we have painted a rather grim picture of the state of European mobilisations against austerity and their capacity to articulate a credible alternative to the neoliberal 'status quo'. However, to be fair, the discussion on how an alternative could be achieved through political processes -at both the European and national levels -has been intensifying with the acceleration of social mobilisations in 2012 and with the preparations for the European elections of 2014. This development is the result of activists' efforts to rebuild cross-border connections among civil society groups and shared proposals among experts' networks. In the coming years it is foreseeable that the search for a common framing and the construction of a common continental political space will constitute a crucial task for anti-austerity movements in their struggle to shape the future of a post-liberal Europe.
